Funferal

Hitchens, the peace movement, and the future

Some time ago I was very happy to come across a copy of Christopher Hitchens’s Letters to a Young Contrarian, which outlined advice on how someone looking to live as a dissident/contrarian etc. should approach life. Some fine lessons were included, but I found something unsettling about his belief that being unpopular was a virtue in and of itself. Just because an idea is generally accepted doesn’t make it wrong.
CH has, of course, lived by his own advice, and came out early on as a cheerleader for war. Some of his ideas had merit, of course, such as his contention that – shock – Saddam Hussein is/was a nasty man (something accepted – indeed argued – by the vast majority of anti-war activists. Still he managed to kill off any persuasive power in his arguments with his petty, snide, and embittered polemics. Unfortunately, today’s Slate contains more of his snide ramblings.
“Extend a hand”? Hogwash. There are people of conviction on all sides of this argument. Hitchens fails to see this, and this failure is his greatest weakness.
Of course, it is reasonable to ask where the anti-war movement (so-styled) now stands, now that ‘the war’ (the one in Iraq) seems to be teetering to a close, with US soldiers draping ‘Old Glory’ over statues of Saddam Hussein. This brings me to a line of thought I’ve been engaging with recently
Edward Mortimer, over at Open Democracy, has addressed some of the relevant issues. Talking about the UN and it’s future potential, he claims in part that “sovereignty, like the state itself, exists to serve and protect the people, not the other way round.”
Speaking personally, I was not opposed to the war because I felt Iraqi sovereignity should trump the right of Iraqi people to live in a safe, just society (I do not). Nor was I opposed to war because I believed that Hussein did not have illegal weapons (though it is possible) or because I believe governments should be allowed to have such weapons (I do not).
Of course, it was difficult to keep up with the reason for the war, it was changed so often. This was designed to keep those opposing war running to catch up. “You don’t believe war is the best way to control WMD? Well how about freedom and justice for the Iraqis?”
Of course, one of the consequences of this is that those opposed to war did not always give coherent or rational reasons for their opposition. Michael Moore‘s comments played well to loyal fans, but did little to persuade waverers of the immorality of war. Similarly, references to former US support for Saddam seemed to prove either that the US had seen the error of their ways, or that the anti-war people were envoking Reagan’s foreign policy.
The strongest arguments against war, in my eyes, have been based in the development of international law. This is not just the ‘the inspectors should have been given more time’ argument, it is something more basic. The argument that the Iraqi regime was harming the Iraqi people was a strong one, but was generally not used by the US, except in PR after they had abandoned the UN route. The reason for this is that the US – and others, but most prominantly the US – has opposed all moves to strengthen the ability of the international community to deal with atrocities committed by sovereign governments.
Most recently the US has opposed the creation International Criminal Court. This is a court designed to deal with:

• The crime of genocide;
• Crimes against humanity;
• War crimes;
• The crime of aggression.

Among the main reasons for US opposition? They worry that their citizens might be prosecuted. They seem to forget that a conviction will depend on guilt, and no peson should be immune based on citizenship.
But aside from this, if it is desirable to ‘free’ people from despotic rulers (and the idea is attractive), then surely it is all the more desirable to have open standards by which governments can be judged, and which can hold rulers to account for their actions. If the US government is truly interested in advancing freedom for all the peoples of the world, then this is the route it should take – pushing for stronger structures, with legitimation for such structures coming from the will of the international community rather than from the imperial desires of a small number of people in the US administration.